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I. Introduction 
Two types of distortions often arise in abortion 
jurisprudence. The first is distortion of scientific fact. Too often 
abortion opponents distort medical facts, and courts accept 
those distortions as true. Take, for example, the claim that 
abortion makes women depressed and suicidal.1 In fact, no 
reputable study supports any such causal link.2 Nonetheless, 
this unfounded assertion has been used to justify laws 
requiring that women seeking abortion be provided with 
certain information lest they later suffer from postabortion 
                                                                                                     
 ∗ Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to 
thank Caitlin Borgmann and Elizabeth Sepper for their helpful comments. 
Thanks also to Charlotte Cassell, Christina Himmel, Adam Hoock, and Shekida 
Smith for excellent research assistance. Finally, many thanks to the editors of 
the Washington and Lee Law Review for their careful editing and for their 
invitation to the Washington and Lee Law Review Symposium “Roe at 40: The 
Controversy Continues.”  
 1. Infra notes 22–26 and accompanying text. 
 2. See infra notes 34–58 and accompanying text (describing studies that 
find no causal link between abortion and future mental illness).  
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trauma.3 In particular, some states now require that doctors 
read to their abortion patients a state-scripted message 
describing their pregnancy as a “whole, separate, unique living 
human being.”4 
Equally without scientific foundation is the claim that 
morning after pills like Plan B act as abortifacients.5 They do 
not. This is not my personal opinion but medical consensus.6 
Nonetheless, certain corporate employers who view abortion as 
a sin disregard the science and argue that it violates their 
religious beliefs to provide Plan B in their company’s insurance 
plan.7 Accordingly, these corporate employers argue that they 
should be exempted from the new requirement that health care 
plans provide morning after contraception without any 
additional charges to the employee.8 
The second kind of distortion that occurs in abortion 
jurisprudence is that the normal doctrine does not apply. 
Whether it be substantive due process, equal protection, or the 
focus of this Article—the First Amendment—the rules are 
different when the claim involves abortion. Thus, despite the 
fact that compelling someone to articulate the government’s 
ideology is anathema in free speech jurisprudence,9 courts have 
upheld mandatory abortion counseling laws that force doctors 
to serve as mouthpieces for the state’s viewpoint.10 Similarly, 
despite the fact that for-profit corporations have never been 
held to have religious rights, several courts have stayed 
application of the new contraception mandate on the grounds 
that it might violate the corporation’s “conscience.”11  
                                                                                                     
 3. See infra note 65 (reviewing state abortion counseling laws). 
 4. Infra note 33. 
 5. Infra notes 111–15 and accompanying text. 
 6. See infra notes 116–45 and accompanying text (describing studies on 
Plan B).  
 7. Infra notes 103–04 and accompanying text. 
 8. See infra notes 105–09 and accompanying text (discussing claims). 
 9. See infra notes 69–73 and accompanying text (discussing compelled 
speech jurisprudence).  
 10. Infra note 68.  
 11. Infra note 153.  
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This abortion exceptionalism12 is problematic for women 
and First Amendment jurisprudence.13 People are entitled to 
their own religious beliefs but not to their own facts.14 Blatant 
distortions of science ought to be rejected outright. Furthermore, 
overlooking First Amendment values only when women’s 
reproductive rights are at stake not only harms women but also 
delegitimizes the entire jurisprudence.15  
                                                                                                     
  12. Cf. Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased 
Counseling Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & 
L. 1, 6 n.18 (2012) (“Although I am sure I did not invent this term [abortion 
exceptionalism], I am not aware of any prior use of it in the legal literature.”). 
 13. In a blog post discussing an earlier draft of this Article, Corbin on 
Abortion Distortions (and What’s Missing), PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 12, 2014), 
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2014/01/corbin-on-abortion-istortions-
and-whats-missing.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2014) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review), Paul Horwitz questions why I have not addressed the 
distortions of free speech jurisprudence in the other direction, particularly the 
complaints of Justice Scalia and others regarding Supreme Court decisions 
upholding limits on abortion protesters near abortion clinic entrances. See, e.g., 
Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 718 (2000) (upholding 8-foot buffer zone and 
noting “our cases have repeatedly recognized the interests of unwilling listeners 
in situations where the degree of captivity make it impractical for the unwilling 
auditor . . . to avoid exposure”); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 
753, 754 (1994) (upholding injunction imposing noise restrictions and creating 
36-foot buffer zone around health clinic entrance but striking other restrictions); 
cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 708 F. 3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 
2857 (2013) (No. 12-1168) (challenging law creating 35-foot buffer zone around 
clinic entrances). To the extent these regulate speech rather than conduct, I 
have discussed elsewhere how the Supreme Court abortion protester decisions 
are rooted in the First Amendment captive audience doctrine. See Caroline Mala 
Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 BOS. U. L. 
REV. 939, 943–57 (2009) (explaining that the Free Speech Clause does not 
guarantee private speakers a right to captive audiences and that the state may 
regulate speakers who invade the privacy of captive audiences to an intolerable 
degree). 
 14. See infra note 150 (discussing the statement that people are entitled to 
their own beliefs).  
 15. These distortions are a longstanding concern. See, e.g., Christina E. 
Wells, Abortion Counseling As Vice Activity: The Free Speech Implications of 
Rust v. Sullivan and Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1724, 
1724 (1995)  
Contrary to Scalia’s suggestion [“that no legal rule or doctrine is safe 
from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its 
application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion”], 
the First Amendment was sacrificed at the abortion altar much 
earlier. In its hurry to dismantle abortion rights in the area of 
abortion counseling, the Court also pulled apart the fundamental 
tenets of the First Amendment . . . [in] Rust v. Sullivan and Planned 
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II. The Abortion Syndrome that Wasn’t There 
The alleged deleterious effect of abortion on women’s mental 
health has been invoked to justify a slew of abortion restrictions. 
The underlying theory is that abortion is traumatic because 
mothers are severing their natural bonds and killing their unborn 
child.16 This view assumes that all women are naturally inclined 
to be mothers, that they bond with their pregnancy from the 
earliest stages, and that they view their pregnancy as their child 
rather than, for example, a collection of cells. Assuming that 
abortion is a traumatic experience, state legislatures have 
passed, and courts have upheld, various mandatory counseling 
laws such as laws that force women to undergo an ultrasound 
and listen to a detailed description of the sonographic image or 
laws that require doctors to inform women that abortion ends the 
life of a human being.17  
In fact, the empirical studies fail to support the underlying 
assumption that abortion is traumatic. Abortions do not make 
women depressed or suicidal; Post Abortion Syndrome does not 
exist.18 On the contrary, women who abort unwanted pregnancies 
                                                                                                     
Parenthood v. Casey. 
Paula E. Berg, Lost in a Doctrinal Wasteland: The Exceptionalism of Doctor-
Patient Speech Within the Rehnquist Court’s First Amendment Jurisprudence, 8 
HEALTH MATRIX 153, 158–59 (1998) (“Both Rust and Casey are inconsistent with 
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence. It is now apparent that Rust and 
Casey are also strikingly inconsistent with the Rehnquist Court’s own free 
speech jurisprudence.”). 
 16. See Brenda Major et al., Abortion and Mental Health: Evaluating the 
Evidence, 64 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 866 (2009) (noting that one conceptual 
framework is that “abortion is a uniquely traumatic experience because it 
involves a human death experience . . . as well as a violation of parental instinct 
and responsibility [and the] severing of maternal attachments to the unborn 
child”); id. (“The view of abortion as inherently traumatic is illustrated by the 
statement that ‘once a young woman is pregnant . . . it is a choice between 
having a baby or having a traumatic experience.’” (quoting David C. Reardon, 
Ending Abortion: Learning the Truth—Telling the Truth, AFTERABORTION.ORG 
(Nov. 23, 1999), http://afterabortion.org/1999/a-new-strategy-for-ending-
abortion/ (last visited Jan 30, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review))).  
 17. See infra notes 61–68 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory 
abortion counseling laws).  
 18. See infra notes 37–41 (discussing studies on abortion and mental 
health).  
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are at no greater mental health risk than women who do not 
abort their unwanted pregnancies.19 Consequently, laws foisting 
unwanted information onto women in order to prevent later 
trauma have no basis in science.  
Courts, unfortunately, accept the false allegations. Their 
willingness to turn a blind eye to scientific distortions is matched 
only by their willingness to distort First Amendment 
jurisprudence to uphold these abortion requirements. Among the 
most egregious examples are state laws that force doctors to 
speak the government’s ideological message.20 In any other 
context, including the regulation of purely commercial speech, the 
state compelling private speakers to recite the government’s 
ideology would be considered a paradigmatic free speech 
violation.21 In the abortion context, however, the rules are 
different.  
A. The Scientific Distortion 
The assumption that abortion tends to traumatize women, 
and that consequently women need protection from their decision 
to abort, crops up regularly. For example, in upholding a federal 
law that banned a certain abortion procedure, Justice Kennedy 
suggested that the ban advanced women’s health.22 It protected 
                                                                                                     
 19. See, e.g., APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION, REPORT 
OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH AND ABORTION: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
2 (2008) [hereinafter APA TASK FORCE] (“[T]he prevalence of mental health 
problems observed among women in the United States who had a single legal 
first-trimester abortion for nontherapeutic reasons was consistent with 
normative rates of comparable mental health problems in the general 
population of women in the United States.”).  
 20. Infra notes 87–95 and accompanying text.  
 21. Note that these laws apply to all doctors, not just government funded 
doctors as in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).  
 22. The law was challenged because it banned an abortion procedure 
without making any exception for women’s health. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 
U.S. 124, 143 (2007). Up until this decision, the Supreme Court only allowed 
abortion restrictions if the law provided that the restrictions did not apply if 
they would jeopardize women’s health. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 
931 (2000) (noting that “a State may promote but not endanger a woman’s 
health when it regulates the methods of abortion”). Here, no such exception was 
made. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 166. The procedure was banned even if it might 
actually be safer than the ones still allowed. Id. at 161–67. How a law with no 
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women not because the banned procedure was physically 
dangerous; in fact, he acknowledged that it might actually be 
safer than the alternatives.23 Rather, it advanced women’s health 
because women might undergo the procedure without fully 
understanding its mental health aftermath.24 Explaining, Justice 
Kennedy first assumes that pregnant women always have a 
strong maternal bond: “Respect for human life finds an ultimate 
expression in the bond of love the mother has for her child.”25 He 
next assumes that women may well suffer from their abortion 
decision: “While we find no reliable data to measure the 
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant they once created 
and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.”26 
                                                                                                     
exception to protect women’s health advances women’s health is, of course, 
something of a mystery. 
 23. See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 161–64 (noting that while some medical 
experts disagree, acknowledging that “[t]he District Court for the District of 
Nebraska concluded ‘the banned procedure is, sometimes, the safest abortion 
procedure to preserve the health of women.’ The District Court for the Northern 
District of California reached a similar conclusion”).  
 24. Id. at 159. 
 25. Id. This assumption that all women have a natural propensity towards 
motherhood is echoed in the South Dakota Task Force to Study Abortion, the 
findings of which were incorporated into law: “The pregnant mother, in virtually 
every instance, considers having an abortion because she, or others in her life, 
believes that her circumstances render the timing of motherhood—not 
motherhood itself—inconvenient or undesirable.” S.D. TASK FORCE TO STUDY 
ABORTION, REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA TASK FORCE TO STUDY ABORTION 34 
(2005) [hereinafter S.D. TASK FORCE].  
 26. Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159. Justice Kennedy then suggests that doctors 
will shy away from telling women the gruesome details of this abortion 
procedure. See id. (“In a decision so fraught with emotional consequences some 
doctors may prefer not to disclose precise details of the means that will be used, 
confining themselves to the required statement of risks the procedure entails.”). 
As a result, women, to the detriment of their mental health, may only fully 
understand what they have done after the fact. See id. at 183–84 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Because of women’s fragile emotional state and because of the 
‘bond of love the mother has for her child,’ the Court worries, doctors may 
withhold information about the nature of the intact D & E procedure.”). In 
dissent, Justice Ginsburg points out that if the problem is lack of information, 
the solution should be providing information, not banning a potentially safer 
procedure. See id. at 184 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The solution the Court 
approves, then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and 
adequately, of the different procedures and their attendant risks. . . . Instead, 
the Court deprives women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at 
the expense of their safety.” (citation omitted)). 
ABORTION DISTORTIONS 1181 
This passage—which explicitly concedes the lack of scientific 
evidence—is often cited to justify various “informed consent” 
requirements that would not be warranted in other medical 
contexts.27  
At least Justice Kennedy admitted he did not have evidence 
to back up his assumptions.28 Legislatures across the country 
have been more assured in declaring that these laws are needed 
to protect women’s mental wellbeing.29 For example, in justifying 
its mandatory abortion counseling law, South Dakota concluded 
that “a minimum of 10–20% of women experience adverse, 
prolonged, post-abortion reactions.”30 According to South Dakota, 
women who have an abortion suffer from guilt, postabortion 
anger and resentment, anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, 
psychological numbing, depression, suicide ideation, substance 
abuse, relationship problems, and parenting difficulties.31 In 
short, the psychological harm of discovering after the fact that 
“she [has] killed her child is often devastating.”32 To stave off this 
parade of horribles, women must learn about the enormity of the 
abortion act and its attendant risks. Specifically, doctors in South 
Dakota must tell their abortion patients that they are about to 
“terminate the life of whole, separate, unique living human 
being” and that abortion increases their risk of suicide and 
suicide ideation.33  
                                                                                                     
 27. See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory 
abortion counseling laws). 
 28. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no 
reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created 
and sustained.” (italics added)). 
 29. See S.D. TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 47–48 
The Task Force finds that it is simply unrealistic to expect that a 
pregnant mother is capable of being involved in the termination of 
the life of her own child without risk of suffering significant 
psychological trauma and distress. To do so is beyond the normal, 
natural, and healthy capability of a woman whose natural instincts 
are to protect and nurture her child. 
 30. Id. at 42. The study continues: “This translates into at least 130,000 to 
260,000 new cases of serious mental health problems each year in the U.S.” Id.  
 31. Id. at 43–46. 
 32. Id. at 47.  
 33. Id. at 10 (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-10.1(1)(b) (2013)); id. 
§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii). 
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The problem is that abortion does not in fact undermine 
women’s mental health. There is no Post Abortion Syndrome.34 
Abortion does not increase women’s risk of depression or 
suicide.35 All the most sound studies show that in terms of mental 
health, women who abort unwanted pregnancies fare no worse 
than women who bring their unwanted pregnancies to term.36 
Every literature review of the empirical studies arrives at the 
same conclusion: abortion does not cause mental health 
problems.37 Here’s a sampling:  
                                                                                                     
 34. See Nada L. Stotland, The Myth of the Abortion Trauma Syndrome, 268 
J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2078, 2078 (1992) (“This is an article about a medical 
syndrome that does not exist.”). 
 35. See, e.g., id. at 2079 (noting a study where of the 207 women 
questioned, “94% reported that their mental health improved or remained the 
same after [having an] abortion”).  
 36. In fact, preliminary results from one study that compared women 
seeking abortions who obtained them to women seeking abortions who were 
turned away found that the women who were denied abortions fared more 
poorly in terms of their physical health and economic stability. Joshua Lang, 
What Happens to Women Who Are Denied Abortions?, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/16/magazine/study-women-denied-abor 
tions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Jan. 3, 2014) (reporting on the 
Turnaway Study) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). For 
example, “women denied abortion were three times as likely to end up below the 
federal poverty line two years later.” Id.  
 37. The sole literature review to the contrary, Priscilla K. Coleman, 
Abortion and Mental Health: Quantitative Synthesis and Analysis of Research 
Published 1995–2009, 199 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 180 (2011), has been roundly 
criticized in a way none of the others has been. For example, a review by the 
Royal College of Psychiatrists found that “[a] number of methodological 
problems with the meta-analysis conducted in the Coleman review have been 
identified, which brings into question both the results and the conclusions.” 
NAT’L COLLABORATING CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH AT THE ROYAL COLL. OF 
PSYCHIATRISTS, INDUCED ABORTION AND MENTAL HEALTH: A SYSTEMIC REVIEW OF 
THE MENTAL HEALTH OUTCOMES OF INDUCED ABORTION, INCLUDING THEIR 
PREVALENCE AND ASSOCIATED FACTORS 18 (2011) [hereinafter ROYAL COLLEGE OF 
PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW]. A review by Julia R. Steinberg et al., Fatal Flaws in a 
Recent Meta-Analysis on Abortion and Mental Health, 86 CONTRACEPTION 430 
(2012), identifies some of them. One is violating the guidelines for conducting a 
meta-analysis, including making sure there is no conflict of interest in choosing 
the relevant studies. Id. at 431. Half the studies included in the Coleman meta-
analysis were the author’s own. Id. When deciding whether to include a study, 
there should have been an independent assessment. That did not occur. Id. A 
related issue was that Coleman included many studies with highly flawed 
methodology: “13 of the 23 studies (one paper included two studies) included by 
Coleman did not even merit inclusion in the [Royal College of Psychiatrists 
Review] because they were lower than very poor quality.” Id. at 436. This review 
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• The American Psychology Association Task Force on 
Mental Health and Abortion concluded, after reviewing 
empirical studies published in English in peer review 
journals: “The best scientific evidence published indicates 
that among adult women who have an unplanned 
pregnancy the relative risk of mental health problems is 
no greater if they have a single elective first-trimester 
abortion than if they deliver that pregnancy.”38  
• Reviewing studies on the long-term mental health effects 
of abortion, scientists at Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School 
of Public Health concluded: “A clear trend emerges from 
this systematic review: the highest quality studies had 
findings that were mostly neutral, suggesting few, if any, 
differences between women who had abortions and their 
respective comparison groups in terms of mental health 
sequelae.”39 
• After reviewing the relevant empirical studies, a group of 
doctors wrote in the Harvard Review of Psychiatry: “The 
most well controlled studies continue to demonstrate that 
there is no convincing evidence that induced abortion of an 
unwanted pregnancy is per se a significant risk factor for 
psychiatric illness.”40  
• In their study for the U.K. Academy of Medical Royal 
Colleges, the National Collaborating Centre for Mental 
Health and the Royal College of Psychiatrists concluded 
that the best available evidence showed that “rates of 
                                                                                                     
then concludes that “[l]ike others, we strongly question the quality of this meta-
analysis of 22 papers just as the reliability, validity, and replicability of some of 
the studies in the meta-analysis have been questioned.” Id. at 430. Or, put more 
pointedly, “[a] meta-analysis cannot be used to make good science out of (mostly) 
bad science.” Id. at 436.  
 38. APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, at 1. The Task Force reaffirmed their 
finding in a published study. See Major et al., supra note 16, at 863 (“The most 
rigorous studies indicated that within the United States, the relative risk of 
mental health problems among adult women who have a single, legal, first-
trimester abortion of an unwanted pregnancy is no greater than the risk among 
women who deliver an unwanted pregnancy.”). 
 39. Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental Health 
Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 CONTRACEPTION 436, 436 
(2008).  
 40. Gail Erlick Robinson et al., Is There an “Abortion Trauma Syndrome”? 
Critiquing the Evidence, 17 HARV. REV. PSYCHIATRY 268, 276 (2009).  
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mental health problems for women with unwanted 
pregnancy were the same whether they had an abortion or 
gave birth.”41  
Studies that find otherwise suffer from serious 
methodological flaws.42 One of the most common flaws is the lack 
of an appropriate comparison group.43 “Several studies compared 
women who had an abortion with women who carried their 
pregnancy to term without accounting for pregnancy intention.”44 
Comparing women with unwanted pregnancies to women with 
wanted pregnancies is essentially comparing apples to oranges.45 
It makes it impossible to discern whether postabortion outcomes 
are attributable to the abortion or to the unwanted pregnancy.46 
Well-designed studies, in other words, must control for 
wantedness versus unwantedness.47  
Well-designed studies also control for other co-occurring and 
confounding variables, such as prior mental health or exposure to 
violence.48 It is impossible to conclude that an abortion caused 
                                                                                                     
 41. ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW, supra note 37, at 8.  
 42. See Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 276 (“To date, the published 
studies concluding that abortion causes psychiatric illness have numerous 
methodological problems . . . .”). 
 43. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (“Having an appropriate 
comparison group is critical to disaggregating the impact of abortion as opposed 
to other key factors and confounders.”); Major et al., supra note 16, at 865 (“It is 
not appropriate to compare women who have had an abortion with women who 
have never been pregnant, or with women who have given birth to a wanted 
child.”).  
 44. Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438; see also Major et al., supra note 
16, at 870 (“Controlling for the ‘wantedness’ of pregnancy is particularly 
important.”).  
 45. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (“Women who have an 
unintended pregnancy may be very different than women who have an intended 
pregnancy and may be predisposed to different mental health outcomes 
regardless of undergoing an abortion experience.”); Robinson et al., supra note 
40, at 270 (“Women with unwanted pregnancies are more likely to suffer from a 
number of co-occurring life stressors, including childhood adversity, relationship 
problems, exposure to violence, financial problems, and poor coping capacity, all 
of which contribute to emotional distress.”).  
 46. See Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 272 (“The effects of abortion are 
often confounded with the effects of an unwanted pregnancy.”).  
 47. See id. at 270 (“At a minimum, the appropriate comparison group for 
assessing relative risks of negative mental health outcomes of . . . abortions is 
women who carry unwanted pregnancies to term.”).  
 48. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW, supra note 37, at 7 
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mental health problems without knowing whether those problems 
predated the abortion.49 Yet, studies that claim to establish this 
link generally fail to measure pre-existing mental health issues.50 
Indeed, the single best predictor of mental health problems after 
an abortion is mental health problems before the abortion.51  
In sum, “mental health problems that develop after an 
abortion may not be caused by the procedure itself, but instead 
may reflect other factors associated with having an unwanted 
pregnancy or antecedent factors unrelated to either pregnancy or 
abortion, such as . . . intimate-partner violence.”52 The failure to 
control for these alternate explanations “would likely result in 
                                                                                                     
(“Failing to properly take into account important factors (such as previous 
mental health problems, whether the pregnancy was wanted or not, intimate 
partner violence and abuse) in many studies limits our understanding of the 
complex relationships between unwanted pregnancy, abortion, birth, and 
mental health.”); Major et al., supra note 16, at 871 (“Most studies did not 
adequately measure or control for co-occurring risks or confounding variables.”). 
 49. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (“Adjusting for prepregnancy 
mental health, which is a major predictor of current and future mental health, 
is critical to isolating the effects of abortion on mental health.”).  
 50. See, e.g., Nada L. Stotland, Induced Abortion and Adolescent Mental 
Health, 23 CURRENT OPINION IN OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 340, 341 (2011) 
(“Prominent among the methodological flaws of studies claiming negative 
psychiatric effects are . . . the absence of any, or any meaningful, data on the 
baseline, or preabortion, mental health of the patients . . . .”); cf. Trine Munk-
Olsen et al., Induced First-Trimester Abortion and Risk of Mental Disorder, 364 
N. ENGL. J. MED. 332, 337 (2011) (“We found that the rate of a psychiatric 
contact differed appreciably between girls and women who had an abortion and 
girls and women who gave birth, even before the abortion or birth occurred.”).  
 51. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF PSYCHIATRISTS REVIEW, supra note 37, at 8 
(concluding that the best available evidence showed that “[t]he most reliable 
predictor of post-abortion mental health problems was having a history of 
mental health problems before the abortion”); APA TASK FORCE, supra note 18, 
at 2 (“Across studies, prior mental health emerged as the strongest predictor of 
postabortion mental health.”); Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 270 (“Many 
studies attribute post-abortion mental states to the abortion experience without 
providing adequate control for pre-abortion mental states—even though the 
literature suggests that previous psychiatric history is the most consistent 
predictor of psychiatric disorders following abortion.”). 
 52. Major et al., supra note 16, at 863; see also Robinson et al., supra note 
40, at 270–71 (“Studies that do not take into account preexisting or co-occurring 
stressful circumstances in the lives of women having abortions may attribute 
distress to the abortion when it is actually due to those other circumstances.”).  
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spurious associations.”53 Furthermore, it leads to ignoring the 
actual causes of women’s mental distress.54  
These are only a couple of methodological shortcomings that 
mar the studies claiming that abortion causes mental health 
problems. Additional ones include sampling bias,55 poor outcome 
measurement,56 and interpretation problems,57 among others.58  
Not surprisingly, scientists regularly urge that policy not be 
based on flawed science.59 In particular, they advise that 
                                                                                                     
 53. Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438.  
 54. See Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 277  
It should also be remembered that the best predictor of mental 
disorder after an abortion is a pre existing mental disorder, which is 
strongly associated with exposure to sexual abuse and intimate 
violence; to ignore these factors would be potentially to ignore the 
actual causes of women’s distress following an abortion. 
 55. For example, selecting women who belong to post-abortion support 
groups. Major et al., supra note 16, at 871. Another example: “[i]n a country 
which only allows women with health problems or traumatic sexual histories to 
access abortion, comparing the mental health of aborting women with 
nonaborting women may produce spurious associations.” Charles et al., supra 
note 39, at 438.  
 56. An example of this is the failure to use a valid, reliable, clinically 
relevant measure of mental health. Major et al., supra note 16, at 872. 
Alternately, many studies focus only on negative mental health outcomes: 
“Assessing the clinical significance of abortion, as with any medical procedure, 
requires asking ‘What is the benefit?’ as well as ‘What is the harm?’ of the 
procedure compared with relevant alternatives.” Id. at 872.  
 57. See Major et al., supra note 16, at 438 (“The most frequent 
interpretation problem encountered was the inference of causation from 
correlational data.”); Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438 (noting that conflating 
correlation with causation as a methodological flaw present in abortion studies). 
 58. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 438, 446 (rating studies based on 
(1) appropriateness of comparison groups; (2) control for preabortion mental 
health status; (3) confounder control; (4) mental health measurement; 
(5) selection bias; (6) information bias; and (7) conflating correlation with 
causation and finding that out of 19, none were excellent, 4 were very good, 8 
were fair, 8 were poor, and 1 was very poor); Major et al., supra note 16, at 884  
Our review revealed that major methodological problems pervade 
most of the literature on abortion and mental health. These include 
(a) use of inappropriate comparison or contrast groups; (b) inadequate 
control for co-occuring risk factors/potential confounders; (c) sampling 
bias; (d) inadequate measurement of reproductive history, 
underspecification of abortion context, and problems associated with 
underreporting; (e) attribution; (f) poor measurement of mental 
health outcomes and failure to consider clinical significance; 
(g) statistical errors; (h) interpretation errors.  
 59. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 449 (“Programs and policies based 
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mandatory abortion counseling laws be rescinded.60 “If the goal is 
to help women, we are obligated to base program and policy 
recommendations on the best science, rather than using science 
to advance a political agenda.”61 
B. The First Amendment Distortion 
Despite the lack of any solid scientific evidence supporting 
claims that women need supplemental information to avoid 
abortion trauma, state after state has passed laws forcing doctors 
to tell women a range of information about their procedure.62 
While the doctrine of informed consent already requires doctors 
to tell patients about the material medical risks of a proposed 
                                                                                                     
on claims derived from flawed research should be modified to reflect the most 
scientifically sound literature.”); Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 276 (“To date, 
the published studies concluding that abortion causes psychiatric illness have 
numerous methodological problems; since their conclusions are questionable, 
they should not be used as a basis for public policy.”).  
 60. See Charles et al., supra note 39, at 449 (“[E]nforcement of so-called 
‘informed consent’ laws (which often provide misinformation regarding mental 
health risks of abortion) is unwarranted based on the current state of the 
evidence.”).  
 61. Id. at 449. The irony is that it may be the abortion counseling, rather 
than the abortion itself, which increases the risk of women’s mental distress.  
In one of the few experimental studies related to abortion, Mueller 
and Major found that increasing a women’s belief in her ability to 
deal with having an abortion decreased her likelihood of experiencing 
depressive symptoms following abortion. Such findings suggest that 
insofar as inaccurate “informed consent scripts” undermine a 
woman’s belief in her ability to cope after an abortion, they may 
contribute to her risk for depression. 
Robinson et al., supra note 40, at 271.  
 62. See, e.g., GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: COUNSELING AND 
WAITING PERIODS FOR ABORTION (2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/ 
spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (providing a table of various state requirements); 
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: REQUIREMENTS FOR ULTRASOUND 
(2014) (providing a table of state ultrasound requirements). Did the scientific 
distortion lead to the jurisprudential distortion? In other words, would getting 
the science right make a difference? Perhaps not, especially if, as it appears to 
be the case, the real point of the laws is not to protect women but to stop 
abortion. But the claim that these laws are meant to inform and help women—
they are usually called Women’s Right to Know laws—does give cover for this 
goal. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict 
and the Spread of Women-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 
(2008).  
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procedure and its alternatives,63 the mandated requirements go 
far beyond providing that medical information. Instead, as 
encouraged by the Supreme Court, they are calculated to 
convince women to choose childbirth over abortion.64 In South 
Dakota, doctors must tell any woman seeking to end her 
pregnancy that an abortion will “terminate the life of a whole, 
separate, unique living human being” and that “the pregnant 
woman has an existing relationship with that unborn human 
being.”65 Doctors have challenged these laws as violating their 
free speech rights.66 Under normal free speech jurisprudence, 
these content-based requirements would be subject to strict 
                                                                                                     
 63. See AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 8.08 (2012) (“The physician’s 
obligation is to present the medical facts accurately to the patient . . . in 
accordance with good medical practice.”). 
 64. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992) 
(“[W]e permit a State to further its legitimate goal of protecting the life of the 
unborn by enacting legislation aimed at ensuring a decision that is mature and 
informed, even when in so doing the State expresses a preference for childbirth 
over abortion.”). 
 65. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(b)–(c) (2013). North Dakota has 
added a nearly identical requirement. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-
02(11)(a)(2) (2013) (requiring that women who seek an abortion be told orally 
and in writing that “[t]he abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, 
unique, living human being”); see also, e.g., IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1(a)(1)(E) 
(2013) (requiring that physicians inform abortion patients that “human physical 
life begins when a human ovum is fertilized by a human sperm”); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 65-6709(b)(5) (2013) (requiring the physician to inform the woman in 
writing that “the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, 
living human being”); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.027.1(2) (2013) (requiring the 
physician to provide printed material stating that the “life of each human being 
begins at conception” and that an “[a]bortion will terminate the life of a 
separate, unique, living human being”). 
 66. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 726–28 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (challenging the requirement that doctors inform women 
that they are about to “terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique living 
human being”); see also Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 
893–94 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (challenging requirement that doctors inform 
abortion patients of “all known medical risks of the procedure and statistically 
significant risk factors” including an “increased risk of suicide ideation and 
suicide”). 
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scrutiny and almost certainly struck down.67 That, however, is 
not what has happened.68  
The Free Speech Clause protects the right to speak as well as 
the right to not speak.69 This right against compelled speech was 
first established in a case challenging a state requirement that 
schoolchildren recite the pledge of allegiance every morning.70 In 
striking down the law, the Supreme Court famously observed: “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is 
that no official, high or petty, shall prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of 
opinion or force citizens to confess by word or action their faith 
therein.”71 In other words, the government cannot compel anyone 
to express agreement with government ideology. Such compulsion 
would violate the freedom of conscience the Free Speech Clause 
was designed to protect.72 It is as anathema as the state 
censoring speech it disapproves.73  
Consequently, any time the government regulates the 
content of a person’s speech, whether by prohibiting it or 
                                                                                                     
 67. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (noting 
that content-based speech regulations are generally subject to strict scrutiny); 
Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 
105, 118 (1991) (same). 
 68. See Rounds, 530 F.3d at 738 (“We conclude that the district court erred 
in granting a preliminary injunction based on Planned Parenthood’s claim that 
the Act violates physicians’ First Amendment Rights.”); Rounds, 686 F.3d at 906 
(“On its face, the suicide advisory presents neither an undue burden on abortion 
rights nor a violation of physicians’ free speech rights.”). 
 69. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (“[F]reedom of 
thought protected by the First Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak 
freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all.”); see also Hurley v. Irish–
Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (explaining 
that the First Amendment protects the right to decide what to say and what not 
to say). 
 70. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 628–30 (1943). 
 71. Id. at 642.  
 72. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234–35 (1977) (“[A]t 
the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an individual should be free 
to believe as he will, and that in a free society one’s beliefs should be shaped by 
his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.”). 
 73. See Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
162 (1973) (“[I]t is anathema to the First Amendment to allow Government any 
role of censorship over newspapers, magazines, books, art, music, TV, 
radio . . . .”). 
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compelling it, the default rule is that the regulation is 
unconstitutional unless it survives strict scrutiny.74 Speech laws 
that control not just the subject matter but viewpoint are 
especially suspect, and especially unlikely to pass such exacting 
scrutiny.75 Imagine, for example, a law forbidding obstetrician-
gynecologists from telling their patients about various child 
support or social services available to pregnant or parenting 
women.76 Or, imagine that the government compelled doctors to 
advise pregnant women with two or more children to choose 
abortion given the overwhelming expense of putting three 
children through college.  
In the mandatory abortion counseling cases, however, the 
appeals courts have not applied strict scrutiny.77 Instead, they 
                                                                                                     
 74. See supra note 67 (referring to cases that require the application of 
strict scrutiny in content-based restrictions); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 
377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”). This 
does assume that the government is regulating speech as opposed to regulating 
conduct that incidentally affects speech. It also assumes that, as here, the 
government is regulating private speech and not its own speech.  
 75. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 
(1995)  
When the government targets not subject matter, but particular 
views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First 
Amendment is all the more blatant. Viewpoint discrimination is thus 
an egregious form of content discrimination. The government must 
abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology 
or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the 
[regulation].  
(citations omitted); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386 (holding that even for unprotected 
categories of speech, “[t]he government may not regulate use based on 
hostilityor favoritismtowards the underlying message expressed”). 
 76. South Dakota is one of many states that require that doctors provide 
this type of information to their abortion patients. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-
23A-10.1 (2)(a)–(c) (2013).  
 77. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–35 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (finding no need to apply strict scrutiny when physicians 
are “required to give truthful nonmisleading information relevant to the 
patient’s decision to have an abortion” (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992))); Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 
F.3d 889, 893 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[T]o succeed under either its undue 
burden or compelled speech claims, [the plaintiff] must show that the disclosure 
at issue ‘is either [sic] untruthful, misleading or not relevant to the patient’s 
decision to have an abortion.’”) (citation omitted); Tex. Med. Providers 
Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that informed consent laws “are part of the state’s reasonable regulation of 
medical practice and do not fall under the rubric of compelling ‘ideological’ 
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dodge the doctors’ free speech claims by applying the Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey78 undue 
burden test—a test designed to protect women’s substantive due 
process right to abortion.79 Casey rejected a substantive due 
process challenge to the requirement that doctors inform patients 
about probable gestational age80 as well as the availability of 
printed materials on various social services81 on the grounds that 
such “truthful and not misleading” information did not impose an 
undue burden on women’s abortion rights.82 In analyzing doctors’ 
free speech claims, appellate courts have applied the same test 
and upheld informed consent requirements deemed “truthful and 
not misleading.”83 A doctor’s right to control her speech would 
seem quite distinct from a patient’s right to control her 
reproduction. Nonetheless, these physicians’ free speech claims 
                                                                                                     
speech that triggers First Amendment strict scrutiny”). 
 78. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 79. After Casey, abortion regulations are not unconstitutional unless they 
impose an undue burden on women who wish to terminate their pregnancy. Id. 
at 876–77. It is possible (though not necessary) to read Casey as finding that 
mandatory counseling does not impose an undue burden as long as the 
information conveyed is “truthful and not misleading.” Id. at 882. Information 
about the probable gestational age of the fetus—the information mandated in 
Casey—met those requirements. Id. at 967–98 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 80. Id. at 881 (majority opinion).  
 81. See id. (describing “printed materials published by the State . . . 
providing information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about 
child support from the father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and 
other services as alternatives to abortion”).  
 82. See id. at 882 (“If the information the State requires to be made 
available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be 
permissible.”). 
 83. See Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905–06 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (upholding law compelling physicians to disclose that the 
relative risk of suicide is higher for women who abort on the grounds that the 
disclosure was truthful and nonmisleading); Tex. Med. Providers Performing 
Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 574–80 (5th Cir. 2012) (applying Casey’s 
undue burden standard and then finding permissible an informed consent law 
compelling physicians “to take and display sonogram images of [the woman’s] 
fetus, make audible its heartbeat, and explain to her the results of both exams”); 
Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 734–36 (8th Cir. 2008) (en 
banc) (upholding a statute compelling physicians to tell patients that an 
abortion “terminate[s] the life of a whole, separate, unique human being” 
because the disclosure is truthful, nonmisleading, and relevant to the patient’s 
decision to have an abortion). 
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are subject to the undue burden test rather than the more 
exacting scrutiny compelled speech claims usually trigger.84  
It might be argued that physician speech merits less scrutiny 
than the typical compelled speech claim because mandatory 
abortion counseling is part and parcel of the regulation of 
medicine, and therefore more akin to regulating conduct than 
speech.85 After all, Casey did note that “[t]o be sure, the 
physician’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, 
but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable 
licensing and regulation by the State.”86  
But in order for abortion counseling laws to be considered 
regulation of medicine, they have to comport with actual medical 
practice.87 Most mandatory counseling does not.88 Proper 
informed consent, where patients learn about the proposed 
procedure and its alternatives, consists of accurate, material, 
medical information.89 Even apart from the inaccurate or 
                                                                                                     
 84. Supra note 83 and accompanying text.  
 85. See, e.g., Scott W. Gaylord & Thomas J. Molony, Casey and A Woman’s 
Right to Know: Ultrasounds, Informed Consent, and the First Amendment, 45 
CONN. L. REV. 595, 634–40 (2012) (arguing that it should not be surprising that 
a lower standard of review would be applied in the medical context because of 
the state’s role in the regulation of the medical profession); cf. Katharine 
McCarthy, Case Note, Conant v. Walters: A Misapplication of Free Speech 
Rights in the Doctor–Patient Relationship, 56 ME. L. REV. 447, 464–65 (2004) 
(arguing that “the states retain the power to regulate the professional conduct of 
physicians, even when speech may be used to carry the conduct out” and 
therefore states can require physicians to provide or not provide information to 
patients).  
 86. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) 
(citations omitted).  
 87. See Robert Post, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture, Informed Consent 
to Abortion: A First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 952–53 (arguing that although “constitutional protections 
accorded to professional speech differ from the constitutional protections 
accorded to other forms of speech . . . the category of professional [medical] 
speech can be determined only by reference to the legitimate practice of 
medicine”). 
 88. See id. at 959–60 (arguing that informed consent laws such as in South 
Dakota do not address medical facts but instead compel ideological speech). 
 89. See, e.g., AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 8.08 (2012) (noting that “[t]he 
physician’s obligation is to present the medical facts accurately to the patient”); 
Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling 
Laws Mandate Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 69 
(2012) (“The professional obligation of informed consent . . . require[s] that 
accurate and material information about risks, benefits, and alternatives be 
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misleading disclosures,90 requiring doctors to tell a patient that 
her unwanted pregnancy is “a whole, separate, unique living 
human being” and that she “has an existing relationship with 
that unborn human being” is not medicine but ideology.91 The 
Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the language on its own 
“certainly may be read to make a point in the debate on the ethics 
of abortion,” but held that it was ultimately scientific and not 
ideological because the statute defined “human being” as “an 
individual living member of the species of Homo sapiens.”92 But of 
                                                                                                     
disclosed to all patients.”). 
 90. For example, six states (Arizona, Kansas, North Carolina, South 
Dakota, Texas, West Virginia) require that women be informed (incorrectly) that 
abortion harms future fertility while five states (Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, 
Oklahoma, Texas) require that women be told (incorrectly) that abortion 
increases the risk of breast cancer. See GUTTMACHER, supra note 62, at 2 
(providing a table of state laws). Meanwhile, South Dakota, among other states, 
also requires that doctors tell their abortion patients about the “increased risk of 
suicide and suicide ideation.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-23A-10.1(1)(e)(ii) (2013). 
As discussed above, no reputable study establishes that abortion itself increases 
the risk of suicide. Supra notes 16–46 and accompanying text. The Eighth 
Circuit nonetheless upheld the disclosure on the grounds that it was merely 
signaling correlation rather than causation. Planned Parenthood Minn. v. 
Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 904–05 (8th Cir. 2012) (en banc).  
 91. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Minn. v. Rounds, 530 F.3d 724, 744 (8th 
Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the language is 
“neither a medical statement nor a fact which medical doctors are trained to 
address, but rather an ‘ideological pronouncement’”); Caitlin E. Borgmann, 
Judicial Evasion and Disingenuous Legislative Appeals to Science in the 
Abortion Controversy, 17 J.L. & POL’Y 15, 40 (2008) (arguing that the state is 
sending the message “that the embryo or fetus is morally equivalent to a child, 
that the pregnant woman is already the ‘mother’ of that child, and that to 
proceed with the abortion would be to murder her own child”); Caroline Mala 
Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. 
REV. 939, 1006–07 (2009) (“[T]he state-dictated message to pregnant women in 
South Dakota is not that her embryo belongs to the species Homo sapiens but 
that she is killing a member of the human race who deserves to live.”); Post, 
supra note 87, at 956  
Whether the fetus is a ‘human being’ is . . . understood by all sides to 
the abortion controversy to be an essentially contested moral 
proposition. For South Dakota to require a physician to “inform” his 
patient that she will be terminating the life of a “human being” is 
consequently not innocent. It deliberately and provocatively 
incorporates the language of ideological controversy and forces 
physicians to affirm the side of those who oppose abortion. 
 92. Rounds, 530 F.3d at 735–36 (majority opinion) (quoting S.D. HB 1166 
§ 8(4)). Thus, the only medical information conveyed is that the woman is 
pregnant with a member of the species Homo sapiens.  
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course pregnant women already know they are carrying humans 
and not pandas.93 Thus, the mandatory abortion counseling is not 
providing any material medical information. Instead, it expresses 
the government’s view of abortion. Conveying the government’s 
moral stance on abortion is simply not part of medical practice. 
To the contrary, among the doctor’s professional and ethical 
obligations is to respect her patient’s autonomous 
decisionmaking94 and provide her patient with the (relevant, 
accurate, nonmisleading) medical information she needs to make 
her own decisions.95  
In short, contrary to fundamental free speech principles, the 
government is permitted to force private individuals to convey its 
ideological message. This compulsion not only violates physicians’ 
free speech but also results in an incoherent free speech 
jurisprudence. If free speech protection is supposed to do 
anything, it is supposed to prevent imposition of government 
orthodoxy. Yet mandatory abortion counseling does just that: it 
forces doctors to fall into line with state orthodoxy regarding 
abortion. 
II. The Abortion that Wasn’t There 
While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s96 
individual mandate was the center of attention during the first 
round of constitutional challenges to it,97 the “contraception 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Borgmann, supra note 91, at 38–39 (“To accept the South Dakota 
legislature’s findings as scientific fact is to make the absurd suggestion that 
pregnant women do not know that the embryo or fetus they are carrying is of 
the human species.”); Corbin, supra note 91, at 1006 (“[U]nless the legislature 
feared that women might think they are carrying dolphins or pandas instead of 
Homo sapiens, the statement clearly has a moral message.”).  
 94. See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND 
THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT (1986). The main ethical requirements of 
physicians towards their patients involve (1) respect for patient autonomy; 
(2) beneficence or non-maleficence (“do no harm”); and (3) justice. Id. at 5.  
 95. Supra note 89; see also AMA CODE OF MED. ETHICS § 8.08 (2012) (noting 
that “[t]he patient should make his or her own determination about treatment”).  
 96. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 97. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012) 
(addressing the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
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mandate” is fast becoming the star of another round of 
challenges, this time on religious liberty grounds.98 Under the 
landmark health care law, large employers99 must now provide 
their employees with health insurance that covers basic 
preventive care.100 For women, basic preventive care encompasses 
access to FDA-approved contraception,101 including “morning 
after” pills such as Plan B and Ella.102  
Among those bringing religious liberty claims are large, for-
profit corporations and their devout owners who view abortion as 
equivalent to murder.103 They argue that to facilitate this sin in 
any way, even by owning a corporation whose health insurance 
plan covers abortifacients like Plan B and Ella, contravenes their 
deeply held faith.104 
                                                                                                     
Act’s individual mandate). 
 98. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. 119, 
131 (2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012)). 
 99. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(A) (2012) (defining “applicable large 
employer” specifically as an employer with “an average of at least 50 full-time 
employees during the preceding calendar year”). 
 100. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. 
119, 131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2012)). 
 101. See 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. 
§ 54) (noting that the preventive care services included are supported by the 
Health Resources and Services Administration guidelines, which require 
coverage for all FDA-approved contraceptive methods). 
 102. See Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/ 
ForConsumers/ByAudience/ForWomen/FreePublications/ucm313215.htm (last 
updated Aug. 27, 2013) (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (listing Plan B and Ella as 
methods of emergency contraception) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); FDA News Release: FDA Approves Ella Tablets For Prescription 
Emergency Contraception, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/ 
PressAnnouncements/ucm222428.htm (last updated Apr. 22, 2013) (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2013) (approving Ella) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 103. Infra notes 104–15. Other plaintiffs challenging the contraception 
mandate oppose all contraception. This Article focuses solely on the subset of 
plaintiffs who object to abortion but not contraception.  
 104. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120, 1125 
(10th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-354) (arguing that 
the contraception mandate forces them to facilitate abortion in violation of 
religious beliefs); Conestoga Wood Specialities Corp. v. Sebelius, 724 F.3d 377, 
381–82 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 678 (2013) (No. 13-354) (same); 
Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1112 (D. Colo. 2013) (same); Sharpe 
Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., No. 2:12–CV–92–DDN, 
2012 WL 6738489, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012) (same); Am. Pulverizer Co. v. 
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The lawsuits allege that the contraception mandate imposes 
a substantial burden on the employers’ religious conscience and 
violates both the Free Exercise Clause and the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act.105 Sometimes the corporate owners claim that 
the requirements burden their own conscience.106 However, aware 
that the mandate does not require them individually but rather 
their legally distinct companies to fund the health insurance 
plans, oftentimes they claim that the mandate burdens the 
religious conscience of their for-profit corporations.107 This is a 
novel religious liberty claim: Never before have for-profit 
corporations claimed to have free exercise rights.108  
These challenges have already resulted in a circuit split, with 
some appellate courts accepting the argument that the 
contraception mandate burdens the religious conscience of for-
profit corporations.109 For plaintiffs like Hobby Lobby Stores, this 
outcome depends on two distortions. First, the court must accept 
                                                                                                     
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 12–3459–CV–S–RED, 2012 WL 
6951316, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (same); O’Brien v. U.S. Dep’t of Health 
& Human Servs., 894 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1159 (E.D. Mo. 2012) (same). 
 105. See supra note 104 (citing relevant cases).  
 106. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381–82 (arguing that 
the contraception mandate violated the religious liberty of owners of a for-profit 
corporation); Korte v. Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 658–59 (7th Cir. 2013) (same); 
Gilardi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 
2013) (same); Autocam Corp. v. Sebelius, 730 F.3d 618, 620–21 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(same). 
 107. See Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 381 (describing 
plaintiffs’ argument that the contraception mandate burdened religious liberty 
of the for-profit corporation); Hobby Lobby Stores, 723 F.3d at 1122 (same); 
Korte, 735 F.3d at 658 (same); Gilardi, 733 F.3d at 1210 (same); Autocam Corp., 
730 F.3d at 621 (same).  
 108. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 133 S. Ct. 641, 643 
(2012) (noting that the Supreme Court has never addressed whether for-profit 
corporations can assert religious liberty claims).   
 109. Compare Korte, 735 F.3d at 687 (holding that the contraception 
mandate violates for-profit corporations religious rights under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act), and Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 723 F.3d at 1126, 
1128–29 (holding that a for-profit corporation has free exercise rights and that a 
for-profit corporation is a “person” under the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act), with Autocam Corp., 730 F.3d at 621 (holding for profit corporation was not 
a person who could bring a religious liberty claim), and Conestoga Wood 
Specialties Corp., 724 F.3d at 384, 388 (holding that for-profit corporations do 
not have free exercise rights and have no protection under Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act). 
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the erroneous claim that Plan B and Ella are abortifacients. 
Second, the Free Exercise Clause, designed to protect religious 
individuals and their religious associations, must be distorted to 
reach for-profit corporations. While the Supreme Court has not 
yet ruled on the issue of corporate religious liberty—although it 
has granted certiorari—the abortion context raises the possibility 
in a way other contexts would not.110  
A. The Scientific Distortion 
Several lawsuits have been filed by owners who are not 
religiously opposed to contraception but are vehemently opposed 
to abortion. These plaintiffs believe that life begins at fertilization 
and that killing an embryo is a sin:111 “[T]he life of a distinct 
human person begins at fertilization and . . . the grave wrong of 
abortion includes intentionally preventing the embryo’s 
implantation.”112 For them, abortion is “an intrinsic evil and a sin 
against God.”113 Given that abortion is “the moral equivalent of 
homicide,”114 they do not want their company’s health insurance 
plan to provide Plan B or Ella on the grounds that they “are 
widely known as abortifacients in that they frequently function to 
                                                                                                     
 110. See Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 678, 678 (2013) 
(“Petition for writ of certiorari . . . granted.”). 
 111. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120–22 (10th 
Cir. 2013); Verified Complaint at 12, Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 
(D. Colo. 2013) (No. 13–cv–00285–WYD–BNB) (“One of the religious and moral 
teachings which Mr. Briscoe embraces, based on the Holy Bible, is that a 
preborn child is, from the moment of conception, i.e., a fertilized embryo, a 
human being created in the image of God.”). 
 112. Brief for Bart Stupak and Democrats for Life of America at 15, as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs/Appellees & Supporting Affirmance, Newland v. 
Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (No. 1:12–cv–1123–JLK); see also 
Complaint at 5, Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 
12–3459–CV–S–RED, 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) (“As 
evangelical Christians, Plaintiffs believe in the sanctity of human life from the 
moment of conception.”). 
 113. Verified Complaint at 12, Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. 
Colo. 2013) (No. 13–cv–00285–WYD–BNB). 
 114. Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be 
Unfounded, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2012, at A1 (quoting Dr. Donna Harrison, 
Director of Research, American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists). 
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destroy fertilized eggs, which Plaintiffs consider to be abortion on 
demand.” 115  
They are wrong. An abortifacient ends a pregnancy.116 These 
drugs do not end a pregnancy. In order to understand why, it is 
helpful to review some basic biology. Many people erroneously 
believe that pregnancy occurs immediately after sexual 
intercourse, and therefore any measure taken after intercourse 
works to end a pregnancy. That is not actually how our bodies 
work. While the lifespan of an egg does not exceed twenty-four 
hours, sperm can survive for five days.117 Consequently, a woman 
can ovulate up to five days after sex and become pregnant.118 In 
other words, there is plenty of time between sex and fertilization.  
Strictly speaking, pregnancy does not begin until a fertilized 
egg implants in the uterus.119 That is, the medical community 
does not consider a pregnancy to begin when the sperm fuses 
                                                                                                     
 115. Complaint at 3, Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., No. 2:12–CV–92–DDN, 2012 WL 6738489 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 31, 2012); see 
also Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1120–21 (10th Cir. 
2013) (“[T]hese services are drugs and devices that the plaintiffs believe to be 
abortifacients, the use of which is contrary to their faith.”); Verified Complaint 
at 3, Briscoe v. Sebelius, 927 F. Supp. 2d 1109 (D. Colo. 2013) (No. 13–cv–
00285–WYD–BNB)  
In the category of “FDA-approved contraceptives” included in this 
HHS mandate are several drugs or devices that may cause the demise 
of an already-conceived but not-yet-implanted human embryo, such 
as [Plan B and Ella] which studies show can function to kill embryos 
even after they have implanted in the uterus, by a mechanism similar 
to the abortion drug RU-486. 
 Complaint at 5, Am. Pulverizer Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 12–3459–CV–S–RED, 2012 WL 6951316 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 2012) 
(“Plaintiffs consider [Plan B and Ella] to be the equivalent of early abortions.”). 
 116. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 6 (1993) (defining abortifacient as “a drug or other agent that induces 
abortion”). 
 117. See Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson, Review Article: Emergency 
Contraception—Mechanisms of Action, 87 CONTRACEPTION 300, 301 (2013) 
(“[S]permatozoa can survive in the female reproductive tract for 5–6 days after 
intercourse.”). 
 118. See Kristina Gemzell-Danielsson & Chun-Xia Meng, Emergency 
Contraception: Potential Role of Ulipristal Acetate, 2 INT’L J. OF WOMEN’S 
HEALTH 53, 55 (2010) (explaining that unprotected sex may result in pregnancy 
“from 5 days before to 1 day after ovulation”). 
 119. See Rachel Benson Gold, The Implications of Defining When a Woman 
Is Pregnant, 8 GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL’Y 7, 7–8 (2005) (explaining the 
medical definition of pregnancy).  
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with the egg and creates the single-celled zygote.120 Rather, 
textbook biology is that pregnancy starts several days later, once 
the fertilized egg travels down the fallopian tube, starts to divide, 
and successfully embeds itself into the lining of the woman’s 
uterus.121 Notably, less than one half of fertilized eggs complete 
this process.122  
Even relying on the alternate understanding of “pregnancy” 
(pregnancy at fertilization vs. pregnancy at implantation), 
neither Plan B nor Ella work in the way the plaintiffs think the 
medicine works. In other words, even assuming pregnancy began 
at fertilization, morning-after pills do not stop implantation or 
                                                                                                     
 120. The American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), 
Statement on Contraceptive Methods (July 1998); see also Gold, supra note 119, 
at 7 (“[M]edical experts—notably the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists (ACOG)—agree that the establishment of a pregnancy takes 
several days and is not completed until a fertilized egg is implanted in the lining 
of a woman’s uterus.”). A poll of American obstetrician–gynecologists showing 
that fifty-seven percent believe that pregnancy starts at “conception” does not 
prove otherwise. See Grace S. Chung et al., Obstetrician–Gynecologists’ Beliefs 
About When Pregnancy Begins, 206 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 132.e1, 
132.e1 (2012) (describing poll). Why not? Ninety-two percent of those polled 
belong to ACOG, and, as the study itself acknowledged, ACOG equates 
“conception” with implantation. Id. at 132.e3, 132e5; E-mail from Elizabeth 
Sepper, Assoc. Professor of Law, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, to author (Oct. 23, 
2013) (on file with author). 
 121. An amicus brief signed by the American College of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists, Physicians for Reproductive Health, Association of Reproductive 
Health Professionals, American Society for Reproductive Medicine, and 
American Women’s Medical Association, among others, states that “[p]regnancy 
is established only upon conclusion of such implantation.” Brief for Physicians 
for Reprod. Health et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114 (Oct. 21, 2013), cert. granted, 134 
S. Ct. 678 (U.S. Nov. 26, 2013) (No. 13–354) [hereinafter ACOG Amicus Brief]. 
The ACOG Amicus Brief also notes that “[t]he scientific definition of pregnancy 
is also the legal definition of pregnancy, accepted by governmental agencies and 
all major U.S. medical organizations.”. Id. at 13; see also, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 46.202 
(2013) (recognizing pregnancy as “the period of time from implantation to 
delivery”).  
 122. See Stephen S. Hall, The Good Egg, DISCOVER MAG., May 26, 2004, at 
30, 30–39 (“John Opitz, a professor of pediatrics, human genetics, and obstetrics 
and gynecology at the University of Utah, told the President’s Council on 
Bioethics last September that preimplantation embryo loss is ‘enormous.’ 
Estimates range all the way from 60 percent to 80 percent.”); K. Diedrich et al., 
The Role of the Endometrium and Embryo in Human Implantation, 13 HUMAN 
REPROD. UPDATE 365, 366 (2007) (noting that even under optimal conditions, no 
more than 40% of blastocysts implant). 
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kill fertilized eggs. The evidence is particularly conclusive for 
Plan B (active ingredient levonorgestrel), which has been around 
longer and studied in more depth than Ella (active ingredient 
ulipristal acetate).  
Every reputable scientific study to examine Plan B’s 
mechanism has concluded that these pills prevent fertilization 
from occurring in the first place.123 In their press release 
announcing that Plan B would be made available over the 
counter with no age restrictions, the FDA explained that “[t]he 
product contains higher levels of a hormone found in some types 
of daily use oral hormonal contraceptive pills and works in a 
similar way to these contraceptive pills by stopping ovulation and 
therefore preventing pregnancy.”124 In short, Plan B is 
contraception. 
To be fair, when it first approved the drug, the FDA did 
require Plan B labels to mention the possibility that they 
prevented implantation.125 At the time, the scientific studies 
focused on whether the drugs prevented pregnancy rather than 
on how they prevented pregnancy.126 The label reflected that 
uncertainty, noting that the drug “could theoretically prevent 
                                                                                                     
 123. See, e.g., INT’L FED’N OF GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS (FIGO) & INT’L 
CONSORTIUM FOR EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION, MECHANISM OF ACTION: HOW DO 
LEVONORGESTREL-ONLY EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTION PILLS (LNG ECPS) PREVENT 
PREGNANCY 1–2 (2012), http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/health/ 
contraception/ICEC_FIGO_MoA_Statement_March_2012.pdf [hereinafter FIGO 
SUMMARY] (summarizing studies). Indeed, this fact explains why EC is not 100% 
effective in preventing pregnancy, and why it becomes less effective the later it 
is taken. Id.; see also Julie Rovner, Morning-After Pills Don’t Cause Abortions, 
Studies Say, NPR.ORG (Feb. 21, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/ 
health/2013/02/22/172595689/morning-after-pills-dont-cause-abortion-studies-
say (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (“[T]here is now fairly definitive research that 
shows the only way [Plan B] works is by preventing ovulation, and therefore, 
fertilization.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 124. FDA News Release: FDA Approves Plan B One Step Emergency 
Contraceptive for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing 
Potential, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnounce 
ments/ucm358082.htm (last updated June 21, 2013) (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 125. See ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121, at 16 (noting that “[t]he 
product label has not been updated since the product was originally approved in 
1999 and it does not reflect the most current research”); Belluck, supra note 114, 
at A1 (“Labels inside every box of morning-after pills . . . say they may work by 
blocking fertilized eggs from implanting in a woman’s uterus.”). 
 126. Belluck, supra note 114, at A1. 
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pregnancy by interfering with a number of physiological 
processes” including “interfering with ovulation or 
implantation.”127 The possibility was not supported by any 
particular study.128 Again, the mechanism was still not quite 
clear.129  
However, studies conducted since then have established that 
these pills work by preventing ovulation. In one study, for 
example, women who took Plan B before ovulation did not 
became pregnant, while women who took Plan B after ovulation 
became pregnant at the same rates as they would have without 
any medicine.130 Summarizing the most recent research on 
levonorgestrel-only emergency contraception like Plan B,131 the 
International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics (FIGO) 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id.  
 128. See id. (“A New York Times review of hundreds of pages of approval 
process documents found no discussion of evidence supporting implantation 
effects.”); Sandra E. Reznik, Plan B: How It Works, 91 HEALTH PROGRESS 59, 61 
(2010) (“There are absolutely no data to support [the package’s] statement 
[regarding implantation].”).  
 129. Cf. Kevin Clarke, The Emergency Contraception Question, AMERICA: 
NAT’L CATH. REV., http://americamagazine.org/issue/emergency-contraception-
question (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (quoting Erica V. Jefferson, an FDA public 
affairs deputy director, as noting “[i]t is often difficult at the time the drug is 
approved or even afterwards to pinpoint the mechanism of action of the drug”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Experts speculated that 
there might have been two reasons why the possibility was included. One, daily 
birth control pills can alter the lining of the uterus, and some of them share the 
active ingredient of Plan B. Belluck, supra note 114, at A1. Two, “[i]mplantation 
also likely wound up on the label because of what [researcher] Dr. Gemzell-
Daniellsson called wishful thinking by some scientists, who thought that if it 
could also block implantation, it would be even better at preventing pregnancy.” 
Id.  
 130. See FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123 (describing studies); Catholic 
Journal Says Plan B Does Not Cause Abortions, NAT’L CATH. REP., 
http://ncronline.org/print/news/catholic-journal-says-plan-b-does-not-cause-
abortions (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (“[S]ince it takes about a week from an 
egg’s fertilization to its implantation, the scientific evidence that Plan B 
treatment is completely ineffective after five days is overwhelming: It works 
only by preventing fertilization, not by preventing implantation.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 131. Besides Plan B, other levonorgestrel-only emergency contraception pills 
available in the United States include the generics Next Choice One Dose and 
My Way. See JAMES TRUSSELL & ELIZABETH G. RAYMOND, EMERGENCY 
CONTRACEPTION: A LAST CHANCE TO PREVENT UNINTENDED PREGNANCY 2 (2013), 
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ec-review.pdf (noting two generic forms of Plan 
B approved in 2012). 
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reported in 2012 that this emergency contraception works pre-
fertilization.132 In particular, “[t]he evidence shows that” Plan B 
pills “[i]mpair ovulation,”133 “may affect sperm,”134 but “do not 
inhibit implantation.”135 The National Institutes of Health and 
the Mayo Clinic have both updated their website to reflect the 
same conclusion.136 FIGO concludes that Plan B inhibits or delays 
ovulation and that “[Plan B] cannot prevent implantation of a 
fertilized egg. Language on implantation should not be included 
                                                                                                     
 132.  FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123; see also Reznik, supra note 128, at 59 
(“Unlike its predecessors . . . leveonorgesterel acts to prevent pregnancy before, 
and only before, fertilization occurs.”). 
 133. FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123, at 1; see also id. (“A number of studies 
provide strong direct evidence that LNG ECP prevent or delay ovulation. If 
taken before ovulation, LNG ECP inhibit the pre-ovatory luteinizing hormone 
(LH) surge, impeding follicular development and maturation and/or release of 
the egg itself. This is the primary mechanism of action.”); Reznik, supra note 
128, at 59 (“Studies have shown that Plan B suppresses the hypothalamus and 
pituitary glands and thereby wipes out the so-called luteinizing hormone surge. 
Without that hormonal surge, ovulation does not occur.”).  
 134. See FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123, at 1 
Contradictory results exist regarding whether LNG taken post-
coitally and in doses used for EC affects sperm function. Early studies 
suggested that LNG ECPs interfere with sperm motility by 
thickening cervical mucus. However, two in vitro studies found that 
LNG in doses used for EC had no direct effect on sperm.  
 135. See id.  
[In two studies], no pregnancies occurred in the women who took 
ECP’s before ovulation; while pregnancies occurred only in women 
who took ECPs on or after the day of ovulation, providing evidence 
that ECPs were unable to prevent implantation . . . . Most studies 
show that LNG ECPs have no [histological or biochemical] effect on 
the endometrium, indicating that they have no mechanism to prevent 
implantation. One study showed that levonogestrel did not prevent 
the attachment of human embryos to a simulated (in vitro) 
endometrial environment. Animal studies demonstrated that LNG 
ECPs did not prevent implantation of the fertilized egg in the 
endometrium. 
Reznik, supra note 128, at 60–61 (“[B]iological experiments involving both 
animal and human tissue show Plan B has no effect on the endometrium that 
would be compatible with decreased receptivity for implantation.”).  
 136. Ruth Moon, Does Plan B Cause Abortions, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, May 
2013, at 15; Pam Belluck, New Birth Control Label Counters Lawsuit Claim, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2013, at A17. 
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in [its] product labeling.”137 Indeed, it is no longer on the label in 
Europe.138 
In sum, the scientific consensus is that Plan B does not cause 
an abortion under anyone’s definition of pregnancy.139 Although 
there are fewer studies on Ella, the newest research points to the 
same conclusion.140 Ella seems to be more effective than Plan B, 
leading some to speculate as to abortifacient qualities.141 
Published studies, however, have established that Ella’s 
increased effectiveness is due to its greater ability to prevent 
ovulation. Once the lutenizing hormone (LH) that triggers 
ovulation starts to surge, which occurs roughly one to two days 
before ovulation,142 Plan B is no longer able to forestall 
ovulation.143 In contrast, Ella can prevent or postpone ovulation 
even after the LH rise begins.144 In short, “the best available 
                                                                                                     
 137. FIGO SUMMARY, supra note 123.  
 138. See Belluck, supra note 136, at A17 (reporting that European health 
officials have changed labels for the European equivalent of Plan B to clarify 
that the pill “cannot stop a fertilized egg from attaching to the womb”). 
 139. Supra notes 116–35 and accompanying text.  
 140. Infra notes 132–35 and accompanying text.  
 141. See, e.g., Ralph P. Miech, Immunopharmacology of Ulipristal as an 
Emergency Contraception, 3 INT’L J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 391, 391–94 (2011) 
(presenting commentary to American Association of the Pro-Life Obstetricians 
and Gynecologists). 
 142. Joseph B. Stanford et al., Timing Intercourse to Achieve Pregnancy: 
Current Evidence, 100 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1333, 1337 (2002).  
 143. See CATHOLIC HEALTH ASS’N OF THE U.S., ETHICAL CURRENTS: ELLA 
(ULIPRISTAL ACETATE): TAKING ANOTHER LOOK 17–20 (2012), http://www. 
chausa.org/docs/default-source/general-files/6454ef88fd7c45af903d85a0ce3f1f81 
1-pdf.pdf (describing studies that indicate that Ella prevents ovulation in a 
greater percentage of women than Plan B).  
 144. See, e.g., ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121, at 21  
[W]hile [Plan B] is effective at preventing ovulation only when taken 
before the LH surge, [Ella] is still effective at preventing pregnancy 
even when taken after the LH surge has begun, but before the LH 
peak. . . . Although [Ella] has a wider window of effectiveness than 
[Plan B], it still does not prevent release of the egg, and therefore, is 
not effective . . . after the peak of the LH surge. 
Vivian Brache et al., Ulipristal Acetate Prevents Ovulation More Effectively 
Than Levonorgestrel: Analysis of Pooled Data Three Randomized Trials of 
Emergency Contraception Regimens, 88 CONTRACEPTION 611, 616–17 (2013) 
(“[Ella] is the most effective treatment, delaying ovulation for at least 5 days in 
59% of the cycles.”); Gemzell-Danielsson, supra note 117, at 305 (“The window of 
action of [Ella] seems wider than that for [Plan B] since it may, in addition, 
prevent an ovulation after LH has started to rise.”). 
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evidence is that the ability of levonorgestrel [Plan B] and 
ulipristal acetate ECPs [Ella] to prevent pregnancy can be fully 
accounted for by mechanisms that do not involve interference 
with post-fertilization events.”145  
Courts that actually take the time to examine the underlying 
science recognize this scientific conclusion. In his decision 
ordering that Plan B be made available to women of all ages, 
Judge Korman found that “[t]hese contraceptives have not been 
shown to cause a postfertilization event—a change in the uterus 
that could interfere with implantation of a fertilized egg.”146 Pro-
life scientists who have studied the evidence likewise agree. So 
for example, one pro-life researcher, after noting that “[t]here’s no 
evidence [that Plan B prevents implantation],” stated that “[o]ur 
claims of conscience should be based on scientific fact, and we 
should be willing to change our claims if facts change.”147  
                                                                                                     
 145. TRUSSELL & RAYMOND, supra note 131, at 7. A brief submitted on behalf 
of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and several other 
medical groups agreed: “As established by the weight of the evidence, LNG 
[Plan B] and UPA [Ella] function primarily, if not exclusively, by inhibiting 
ovulation, thereby preventing fertilization from occurring . . . . [T]here is no 
evidence that [Ella] affects implantation.” ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121, 
at 15–16; see also Gemzell-Danielsson et al., supra note 117, at 305 (“In 
conclusion, EC with a single dose of 1.5 mg LNG [Plan B] or 30 mg UPA [Ella] 
acts through inhibition of or postponing ovulation but does not prevent 
fertilization or implantation and has no adverse effect on a pregnancy.”).  
 146. Tummino v. Hamburg, 936 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-109, FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION: DECISION PROCESS TO DENY INITIAL APPLICATION FOR OVER-THE-
COUNTER MARKETING OF THE EMERGENCY CONTRACEPTIVE DRUG PLAN B WAS 
UNUSUAL 13 (2005)); see also id. (“Indeed, Diana Blithe, the biochemist who 
supervises research on contraception at the National Institutes of Health 
(“NIH”), opined that the possibility of levonorgestrel-based emergency 
contraceptives having an effect on implantation of fertilized eggs should 
‘definitely’ be taken off the labels for those drugs.”); Reznik, supra note 128, at 
59 (noting that studies indicated no evidence that Plan B “decreased 
receptiveness to implantation”). 
 147. Moon, supra note 136, at 15; see also Clarke, supra note 129 
(“[M]ounting evidence [shows] that levonorgestrel [a Plan B generic] has little or 
no effect on post-fertilization events. In other words, given the limitation of 
scientific certitude, they suggest that Plan B, when administered once, is not an 
abortifacient.”); Fernando Saravi, Comment to Article, Does Plan B Cause 
Abortions?, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.christianity 
today.com/ct/channel/comments/allreviews.html?id=104071&type=article (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014) 
I am a professor of physiology who has reviewed ALL the available 
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While the courts cannot and should not question plaintiffs’ 
religious beliefs, the courts can and should question the accuracy 
of their science. Plaintiffs’ opposition is based on a medical 
mistake. They are religiously opposed to killing fertilized eggs. 
Neither Plan B nor Ella kills fertilized eggs. Courts should not be 
deferential when they encounter obvious scientific error,148 and 
plaintiffs’ claims regarding morning after pills should have been 
dismissed.149 To paraphrase a well-known quip, “everyone is 
entitled to his own [religious beliefs], but not his own facts.”150 
B. The First Amendment Distortion 
The First Amendment distortions in this line of cases are not 
as obvious as in Part II, where courts have simply failed to apply 
free speech doctrine altogether. Instead, the key distortion here is 
that courts are much more willing to entertain the possibility of a 
free exercise violation than current jurisprudence supports. That 
is, instead of affording insufficient First Amendment protection 
(to those challenging limits on reproductive rights), the courts are 
awarding too much First Amendment protection (to those 
                                                                                                     
evidence on levoneorgestrel [sic] used as emergency contraception 
(EC). It has become clear that there is no evidence that this drug,as 
[sic] used for EC, may avoid or inhibit implantation. This is plain 
scientific evaluation; I’m an Evangelical Christian with a strong 
stance against abortion in any form. Of course, I do have moral issues 
regarding the whole EC concept itself. 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 148. See Imani Gandy, Plan B and Ella are Not Abortifacients, But False 
Claims May Hold Up in Court, RH REALITY CHECK (Mar. 27, 2013 8:50 AM), 
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/03/27/plan-b-and-ella-are-not-
abortifacients-but-false-claims-may-hold-up-in-court/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2014) 
(“People are entitled to believe all sorts of things and courts can’t question that. 
That doesn’t make those beliefs correct, and that certainly doesn’t mean that 
those beliefs must be given the force of law.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 149. See id. (“Either something is an abortifacient or it isn’t. The pill, Plan 
B, and Ella aren’t. That should be the end of the discussion.”).  
 150. See CHARLES G. KOCH, THE SCIENCE OF SUCCESS: HOW MARKET-BASED 
MANAGEMENT BUILT THE WORLD’S LARGEST PRIVATE COMPANY 31 (2007) (“As 
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan put it: ‘Everyone is entitled to his own 
opinion, but not his own facts.’”); cf. Gandy, supra note 148 (“Plaintiffs in these 
lawsuits are demanding their ‘religious belief’ in false information and junk 
science be used to trump the rights of others.”). 
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challenging access to reproductive rights). In particular, I would 
argue that they are willing to extend religious liberty protection 
in novel ways in part because of the reproductive rights backdrop. 
That is, I do not think these challenges, especially the claim that 
for-profit corporations are entitled to a religious exemption from 
the contraception mandate, would have gotten as much traction 
in a different context. But because they arise in the context of 
abortion—well, the rules work differently.  
A threshold issue in these cases is whether for-profit 
corporations even have religious liberty rights. Whether for-profit 
corporations are rights-holders under the Free Exercise Clause or 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) is a question of 
first impression.151 Existing religion clause jurisprudence would 
suggest not.152 Nonetheless, courts ruling on contraception 
mandate challenges have been divided in their answer.153 My 
main point is not that for-profit corporations are not entitled to 
religious exemptions—although they really are not.154 Rather, my 
point is that courts are much more likely to accept this novel 
proposition when made in the abortion context.  
A counterfactual example might help make this clear. 
Imagine a family-owned company, let’s call it Hobby Bobby, 
which employs thirteen thousand full-time workers.155 Hobby 
Bobby owns hundreds of stores that sell arts and crafts 
supplies.156 The company is a for-profit corporation.157 As a 
corporation, it enjoys benefits such as limited liability for its 
owners. Actually, the family does not directly own shares in the 
company. Instead, the company is in a trust with the family 
members as beneficiaries of the trust.158 The family members all 
belong to a religion with very strong precepts against killing 
                                                                                                     
 151. Supra note 108 and accompanying text.  
 152. See generally Caroline Mala Corbin, Corporate Religious Liberty (Oct. 
23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing the issue in greater detail) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 153. See supra note 109 (describing circuit split).  
 154. See generally Corbin, supra note 152.  
 155. Cf. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 1122 (10th Cir. 
2013). 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  
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animals. A new federal law mandates that companies with over 
fifty full-time employees provide comprehensive health 
insurance.159 Grandfathered plans are exempted,160 but most are 
expected to soon be extinct.161 Thanks to the new law, Hobby 
Bobby’s employees may receive, without cost-sharing, preventive 
medications, including cholesterol-lowering drugs.162 The family, 
however, objects because they believe the cholesterol medicine 
might be made with animal by-products. (In fact, they are wrong 
about the cholesterol drugs.) They claim that it violates their 
corporation’s religious rights and their own individual religious 
rights for Hobby Bobby to provide employees health care 
insurance that covers these drugs.163  
I suspect that courts would not be as receptive to these 
claims as courts have been to the contraception mandate ones. 
Perhaps I am wrong, but it seems unlikely that the courts would 
ignore an amicus brief filed by the American Heart Association 
that the drugs do not, in fact, contain animal by-products,164 and 
that consequently there is no clash between any religious and 
legal obligations. Nor do I see courts undertaking the doctrinal 
and theoretical contortions necessary to conclude that for-profit 
corporations have a religious right not to provide cholesterol–
lowering medicine.165 Finally, it is hard to picture courts ruling 
that a person’s individual religious liberty is implicated when the 
corporation which is owned by a trust of which she is a 
beneficiary must include in its insurance plan cholesterol 
medication she (erroneously) opposes on religious grounds.  
                                                                                                     
 159. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (2012). 
 160. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1251, 124 Stat. 119, 162 
(2010) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (2012)). 
 161. Infra note 168. 
 162. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2713(a)(4), 124 Stat. at 
131 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)-(c) (2012)). 
 163. An analogous thought experiment can be done with owners whose 
religion opposes psychiatry or other widespread medical care.  
 164. Cf. ACOG Amicus Brief, supra note 121 (explaining that morning-after 
pills work by preventing ovulation).  
 165. It also seems less likely that the courts would conclude that the state 
government lacks a compelling interest in people’s health because of exceptions 
to the law, see, for example, Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc v. Sebelius, 722 F.3d 1114, 
1143 (10th Cir. 2013), or that the law is not narrowly tailored because the 
government could provide these medicines instead, see, for example, Korte v. 
Sebelius, 735 F.3d 654, 686 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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Of course, the doctrinal analysis has also been distorted in 
various ways. In order to conclude that the contraception 
mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, for 
example, a court must find that the mandate substantially 
burdens plaintiffs’ religious conscience, and that the law fails 
strict scrutiny.166 As discussed above, the claim that morning-
after pills substantially burden those opposed to abortion should 
have been dismissed out of hand. The pills are contraception, not 
abortifacients. 
Or take, for example, the claim that the contraception 
mandate cannot advance a compelling state interest because it 
does not protect all employees.167 If the mandate’s goals were 
truly compelling, the argument goes, there would be no (or at 
least fewer) exceptions; the current law, however, grandfathers 
certain existing health care plans168 and exempts employers with 
fewer than fifty employees.169 Accordingly, the law fails strict 
scrutiny. But if that were the rule—that a law cannot be deemed 
to advance a compelling interest unless its reach is essentially 
all-inclusive—then Title VII, which applies only to employers 
with fifteen or more full-time employees,170 does not advance a 
compelling state interest. After all, it does not protect all 
employees from discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
sex, and national origin.171 In fact, the first year it was 
                                                                                                     
 166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012) (describing requirements for a 
successful RFRA claim). 
 167. See, e.g., Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d at 1143 (concluding that 
providing access to free contraception was not a compelling state interest 
because law countenanced exceptions for small and grandfathered companies). 
 168. See 42 U.S.C. § 18011 (describing grandfathered plans). Grandfathered 
plans are those that existed on March 23, 2010, and have not substantially 
changed by either cutting benefits or increasing out of pocket expenses. See 
What If I Have a Grandfathered Insurance Plan?, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-if-i-have-a-grandfathered-health-plan/ (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014) (defining grandfathered plans) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). A survey of American companies conducted 
in 2010 found that ninety percent of large businesses expected to lose their 
grandfathered status by 2014. See Jerry Geisel, Most Health Plans to Lose 
Grandfathered Status: Survey, BUS. INS. (Aug. 10, 2010, 11:05 AM), 
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100810/NEWS/100819995# (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 169. See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H(c)(2) (defining applicable large employer).  
 170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining employer). 
 171. Infra note 172 and accompanying text.  
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implemented, Title VII applied only to employers with one 
hundred or more full-time employees, with the number lowered 
each successive year until it reached twenty-five or more 
employees in its fourth year.172 Even today, more than eighty 
percent of employers are too small to be covered by Title VII.173 
Despite Title VII’s incomplete coverage, it is hard to imagine that 
a court would conclude that ending race discrimination in 
employment was not a compelling state interest, and even harder 
to imagine that courts would contemplate exempting on religious 
grounds a racially discriminatory for-profit corporation.174 
Somehow, though, this reasoning becomes plausible in the 
context of women and their reproductive rights.175  
In short, it is probably not an accident that the question of 
corporate religious liberty has presented itself in a women’s 
reproductive rights case, as the proposition would probably not 
have gotten as much traction if a business enterprise were 
challenging cholesterol medicine, or simply a different employee 
insurance program.  
                                                                                                     
 172. See Milestones in EEOC History: 1965, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/history/35th/milestones/1965.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2014) (“In its first 
year, Title VII applies to employers with 100 or more employees, with coverage 
phased in over the next three years to reach employers with as few as 25 or 
more employees.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The law 
was subsequently amended to cover employers with fifteen or more full-time 
employees in 1972.  
 173. According to the U.S. Small Business Administration, 4,902,520 out of 
5,684,424 employer firms (86.2%) had fewer than fifteen employees in 2011. See 
Robert Jay Dilger, Small Business Size Standards: A Historical Analysis of 
Contemporary Issues, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. 3 (Jan. 3, 2014) 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40860.pdf (noting that 79.3% of employer 
firms had fewer than ten employees and 89.8% of employer firms had fewer 
than twenty).  
 174. Indeed, the Court has even rejected the free exercise claim of a 
nonprofit school seeking an exemption from anti-discrimination law on the 
grounds that the states interest in ending race discrimination was a compelling 
state interest. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) 
(“The governmental interest at stake here is compelling.”). 
 175. One would have also thought that it was no longer open to question 
whether eliminating sex discrimination was a compelling state interest. See 
Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1469, 
1479–83 (2013) (discussing sex equality as a compelling state interest).  
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IV. Conclusion 
Abortion exceptionalism means the rules are different for 
abortion cases. Instead of rejecting baseless scientific claims, 
courts rely on them. Instead of applying existing First 
Amendment jurisprudence, courts ignore fundamental principles 
or distort them beyond recognition. Consequently, false claims 
about abortion have justified mandatory counseling laws, and 
mistaken claims about morning-after pills have allowed for-profit 
corporations to avoid the contraception mandate. These 
distortions not only impede women’s reproductive rights but also 
result in highly problematic precedents. Indeed, the willingness 
to bend the rules when it comes to abortion may result in a 
jurisprudence where for-profit corporations are entitled to 
religious exemptions, even when the exemption burdens the 
corporation’s (whole, separate, unique living human being) 
employees.  
